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Abstract 
 
This paper provides an overview of conceptual issues and recent research findings 
concerning the structure and the role of financial systems and an introduction into the new 
research area of comparative financial systems.  
The authors start by pointing out the importance of financial systems in general and then 
sketch different ways of describing and analysing national financial systems. They advocate 
using what they call a “systemic approach”. This approach focuses on the fit between the 
various elements that constitute any financial system as a major determinant of how well a 
given financial system performs its functions.  
In its second part the paper discusses recent research concerning the relationships between 
financial sector development and general economic growth and development. The third part 
is dedicated to comparative financial systems. It first analyses the similarities and, more 
importantly, the differences of the financial systems of major industrialised countries and 
points out that these differences seem to remain in existence in spite of the current wave of 
liberalisation, deregulation and globalisation. This leads to the concluding discussion of what 
the systemic approach suggests with respect to the question of whether the financial systems 
of different countries are likely to converge to a common structure.  
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I. Comparative Financial Systems as a New Field of Research and Policy  
Since about 15 years, the notion has become more and more widely accepted that financial 
systems are an important field of public policy and of academic research. The underlying 
assumption behind this “discovery” is that in some sense the “quality” of a country’s financial 
system is important. This new conviction is reflected in the fact that policy makers have 
started to be concerned about improving the financial systems for which they have a certain 
responsibility. In the European Union almost all elements of the so-called financial sector 
action plan have recently been implemented. International organisations like the World Bank, 
the EBRD and the IMF have for quite some time spent a great deal of their effort and money 
on helping to improve the financial systems of countries on which they have some influence.  
However, there are a number of problems coming with this “discovery” and the apparent 
consensus. One can summarize them by stating that it is not at all clear what it means to say 
that financial systems are important, why this statement should be true and relevant; and what 
policy implications it might have. What exactly is a financial system? What determines its 
quality? Are there any general standards for evaluating financial systems? For whom and for 
what are financial systems and their quality important? Is there a solid theoretical or empirical 
basis for the assumption that the quality of a financial system is indeed important? And what 
can policy makers do to improve a given financial system?  
Most of the work by academics and practitioners on financial systems has taken empirical 
observations and practical problems as its starting point. Among other things, the frequency 
and severity of financial crises in the period after the demise of the fixed exchange regime of 
the Bretton Woods system spurred this interest. Another factor is that in many countries the 
financial system has undergone dramatic changes in recent years. There was a wave of 
liberalisation and deregulation of national financial systems in the 1970s and 1980s, followed 
by a wave of re-regulation in the next decades. Yet the economic, social and political 
consequences of these developments are difficult to assess on a general scale.   
A comparative perspective is very fruitful for the study of the questions listed above. If one 
looks at different countries, one can easily see that their financial systems differ considerably. 
This diversity has existed for a long time, and at least in some cases it has remained after the 
turbulences of the past decades and in spite of the possible pressure of growing international 
integration and competition to adopt what might be the single best financial system. This 
observation is obviously important for relevant policy efforts. Does it mean that some   3
countries have good financial systems while others have not? And if this is the case, what 
prevents the countries with a bad financial system from adopting a better one? Or does it 
rather imply that what is a good financial system for one country may not be a good system 
for other countries? It is the purpose of this paper to provide a short survey of recent research 
concerning financial systems in general and the diversity of national financial systems in 
particular.  
We start with an attempt to define what a financial system is and by looking at different ways 
of describing and analysing financial systems (section II). Then, in section III, we take a look 
at the existing theoretical and empirical arguments concerning the questions of why, for what 
and for whom financial systems may be important, before we embark on discussing 
differences between countries’ national financial systems in Section IV. The concluding 
section V is dedicated to the question of how financial systems develop over time and 
discusses whether one can expect that the financial systems of different countries are likely to 
converge towards what may be the best type of a financial system. 
 II.  How to Define and Analyse a Financial System 
1. Finance is more than capital  
For decades economists have disregarded finance as a genuine topic. Even when they used the 
term finance what they meant was almost always capital. The underlying concept of capital 
was that of real capital. Real capital is a stock of resources that can be applied as an input into 
future production allowing economic agents to use other resources more productively. 
Machinery, roads or even accumulated knowledge are real capital in this sense, even if they 
are measured in monetary terms. Not finance but capital figures in conventional growth 
theories; and the transfer of capital to so-called developing countries and possibly to certain 
so-called target groups has been the dominant approach of development policy for decades.  
Of course, capital in the sense of real capital is important for any economy. But finance is 
more than capital, and it is a different concept. It is concerned with how economic agents in a 
given society can and do make intertemporal choices, and with intertemporal relationships 
between economic units. Finance is about how economic agents carry over income and 
consumption opportunities from one time period to later time periods, that is, how they save 
or accumulate and hold wealth and how they invest; about how agents finance investments; 
and how they deal with risk. Many of those who now say that finance is important refer to this 
concept, and that is why it should also shape the definition of the term financial system.   4
 
2. A financial system is more than the financial sector  
 
Building on a broad concept of finance, the concept of a financial system is also broad. It 
covers the ways in which financial decisions
1 are made, and can be made and implemented, 
and in which financial relationships are designed and implemented. The description of the 
financial system of a given country or region is contained in the answers to the questions of 
which opportunities the economic agents in this country or region have, and use, to 
accumulate wealth and to transfer income into the future, to fund investment projects and to 
manage risk. Thus, the conceptual starting points are financial decisions and activities of non-
financial firms and households.  
In most economies, many financial decisions and relationships of the households and the 
firms involve banks, capital markets, insurance companies and similar institutions in some 
way. In their totality, those institutions that specialise in providing financial services
2 
constitute the financial sector of the economy. Of course, the financial sector is a very 
important part of almost any financial system. But it should not be taken for the entire 
financial system. Only some 15 years ago, there were some parts of the so-called developing 
world and some formerly socialist countries in which almost no financial institutions existed 
or operated, and still people saved, invested, borrowed and dealt with risks in these countries 
and regions. Thus there can in principle even be financial systems almost without a financial 
sector. But also in advanced economies, many financial decisions and activities completely 
bypass the financial sector. Examples are real saving
3, self-financing and self-insurance and 
informal and direct lending and borrowing relationships.   
One can also illustrate the distinction between the concepts of the financial sector and the 
financial system by invoking the distinction between supply and demand. The financial sector 
only encompasses the supply of financial services while the financial system includes both 
supply and demand and the way in which supply and demand are matched. The broader 
concept suggests looking not only at the institutions of the financial sector but also at those 
decisions and relationships that give rise to a demand for the services of the financial sector as 
                                                 
1 Financial decisions and financial relationships are those involving different points in time or different time 
periods.  
2 The provision of loans and equity participation is one among several financial services; others are payment 
transfers, deposit taking and security transactions, just to name the most important ones.  
3 Building a house or growing a tree or a hedge and even feeding the proverbial “savings pig”, that is, putting 
money into the “piggy bank”, and raising children are forms of real saving and investment that do not involve 
the financial sector. Incidentally, this explains why they are particularly wide-spread in countries whose financial 
sector is not well developed.     5
well as those that do not involve the financial sector at all. Especially if one analysed financial 
systems in a comparative perspective, it could be misleading if one overlooked self-financing 
of investment, real savings, self-insurance and direct financing and investment. 
There is also a second dimension in which the concept of the financial system is broader than 
that of the financial sector.  Financial flows are mirrored in flows of information and flows of 
potential and actual influence. From the perspective of the so-called new institutional 
economics, there are obvious reasons why this is so, and it is also obvious that financial 
flows, information flows, and flows of influence are interdependent. Each of the three types 
of relationship plays a key role in determining the nature of the other two types. Actual and 
potential flows of information and influence constitute the essence of “the corporate 
governance system”. As finance without corporate governance would scarcely be possible, 
the corporate governance system is therefore an integral part of any financial system. 
3. Three conventional ways of analysing a financial system  
There are several approaches of describing and analysing the financial system of a country or 
a region. One approach, which one may call the institutional approach, is largely descriptive, 
focusing on the financial institutions that exist or, as the case may be, fail to exist in a 
country. Even if such a description is supplemented by an analysis of how these institutions 
perform their respective functions and how well they do this, this approach does not lead to 
the analysis of a country’s financial system but merely of its financial sector. Nevertheless, it 
is useful since it generates relevant information, and it may be sufficient to show that national 
financial sectors differ very much.
4 
The second approach is the intermediation approach. It goes back to early work by Gurley and 
Shaw (1960), and focuses on how the funds of the so-called surplus units in an economy, the 
savers, are channelled to the so-called deficit units, the investors, and analyses the extent to 
which banks and other financial intermediaries are involved in this transfer of resources. As is 
well known, intermediaries facilitate the intertemporal exchange of resources between savers, 
mainly households, and investors, mainly the non-financial firms, by reducing transaction 
costs. But intermediation also performs other functions. It allows a transformation of lot sizes, 
                                                 
4 A recent paper by Allen et al. (2004) that contains a descriptive comparison of the financial systems of the 
United States, Great Britain, Germany, Japan and China may serve as an example to show how valuable this 
approach is for a comparative analysis.  
   6
maturities and risks and thereby reduces the conflict of interest that exists between 
savers/financiers and investors/borrowers and makes external financing difficult.  
This approach was originally conceived to understand and measure the role of intermediaries, 
but it can easily be extended to include the role of financial markets. Like intermediaries, 
organised financial markets perform some transformation functions and thereby facilitate 
investment and financing. Evidently this approach does not only look at the financial sector 
but covers the entire financial system, though it does this in a rather simple way. In spite of 
this limitation, it yields interesting insights. For instance, by studying countries’ so-called 
intermediation ratios one can show that the role of banks as intermediaries differs widely 
between countries and gives rise to corresponding differences between the financing patterns 
in these countries. In countries in which banks play an important role as intermediaries, the 
share of bank loans in firms’ external financing is also high.
5   
The third approach goes one step further and generalises the idea of looking at how certain 
financial functions are fulfilled in an economy. This is the so-called functional approach, 
which has been championed by Merton and Bodie in a series of papers. Any financial system 
has to fulfil certain functions. They include the transfer of resources across space and time 
and the transformation of claims and obligations (as already captured in the approach of 
Gurley and Shaw) as well as the allocation of risk, the provision of information, the easing of 
incentive problems and, last but not least the provision of a payment mechanism. The 
fundamental idea of the functional approach is not that a financial system has to perform these 
functions but rather that, while these functions are largely the same at all times and in all 
countries or regions, the institutional arrangements through which they are fulfilled vary 
greatly across time and space.
6  
4. Finance as a system  
All three approaches described so far have their merits and limitations. Each one of them 
yields valuable insights for the comparative study of financial systems. However, for none of 
them, there is a reason why one should speak of financial systems and not merely of finance.  
                                                 
5 See Schmidt et al. (1999) for a comparative study of the role of banks as intermediaries, and 
Hackethal/Schmidt (2004) for a new method of measuring the patterns of firm financing in different financial 
systems.  
6 See Merton/Bodie (1995) for a programmatic exposition of this approach. The work of  Allen and Gale (2000), 
and even more Allen/Gale (2001) follows a similar approach, that is, they focus on the functions of financial 
systems, even though these authors would certainly not subscribe to the Merton-Bodie view that institutional 
differences are more or less coincidental and not really relevant. In fact, they hold the opposite view.     7
This insight has given rise to a fourth approach of describing and analysing financial systems 
which can be called the systemic approach. The label serves to highlight that, and how, the 
various elements of any financial system are related. For instance, the dominant role of capital 
markets in the financial system of the United States is fostered by, and in turn also fosters, the 
strong reliance of non-financial firms on capital market financing, the existence of large and 
well functioning stock exchanges, the wide dispersion of share-holdings, the high level of 
information disclosure to the general shareholding public, the high level of investor protection 
and a corporate governance system that makes the maximization of the share price and the 
wealth of shareholders the supreme and even the exclusive objective of listed corporation.   
One can capture this idea of the elements of a system being mutually supportive with the twin 
concepts of complementarity and consistency. We speak of complementarity if the different 
elements of a given system can take on values such that they mutually reinforce their positive 
effects and mitigate their negative effects on whatever may be the performance standard of 
the system as a whole. In simple words this says that much depends on how well the 
individual elements of the system fit together. Complementarity is a characteristic of any true 
system. In the course of the 1990s, its importance has been demonstrated by different authors 
in fields as far apart as corporate strategy (Porter, 1996), the organisation of industrial 
production (Milgrom/Roberts, 1990) and corporate governance (Hoshi, 1998, and Schmidt, 
2004). That financial systems have this property can be shown in formal models (Hackethal, 
2000, Aoki, 2001) or in a more intuitive way as in Hackethal/Schmidt (2000).  
Complementarity denotes a potential, namely that of achieving some benefit from having 
system elements well adjusted to each other. This potential is not always realised. This leads 
to the twin concept of consistency. We call a system consistent if its elements take on values 
that exploit the potential resulting from complementarity. Describing and analysing a 
financial system with the systemic approach consists in investigating which forms of 
complementarity and consistency exist and to which consequences this leads.  
As it seems, the systemic approach is very useful for the study of financial systems and their 
development over time. It allows a deeper understanding of how a given financial system 
functions, what its mechanisms are and on what its stability and efficiency depend. Moreover, 
it helps to see whether “essential” differences exist between two or more financial systems 
and whether a given financial system changes or has changed in a fundamental way. There are 
indeed fundamental differences between the financial systems of different large economies, 
and in many cases these differences have remained surprisingly stable for a long time.   8
Complementarity is also likely to have an effect on the way in which financial systems 
develop over time. We will come back to this topic in Section V below.   
5. The typology of financial systems 
For many years, students of financial systems have used classifications to characterise 
financial systems. The idea behind any classification is that of a typology. A classification 
makes sense if there are certain types of financial systems; the number of existing types is 
small; the types are clearly different; and real financial systems conform more or less to one 
of these types. The types are idealised descriptions of how the elements of a financial system 
can fit together. Using the terminology of the systemic approach one could say that types of 
financial systems are consistent combinations of financial system elements.   
In recent years, the common classification or typology distinguishes only between two classes 
or types of financial systems:
7 the bank-based financial system and the capital market-based 
financial system. As the name indicates, banks play the dominant role in a bank-based 
financial system. They are important providers of financing for firms, and conversely, firms 
depend to a large extent on bank loans as a source of external financing. Banks are the most 
important deposit takers within the system. Bank-client relationships with firms are close, 
most firms have their “house banks”, and conversely banks play an active role in the 
governance of non-financial firms and in the event that a firm runs into serious financial 
difficulties. Banks are organised as true universal banks, and they dominate the entire 
financial sector.  
The corporate governance regime in bank-dominated financial systems is pluralistic and 
stakeholder-oriented and allows different stakeholder groups, including banks, to play an 
active governance role. The stock market is not a fundamental element of a bank based 
financial system since it does not play a major role in firm financing nor as a “market for 
corporate control”. The possible fact that market capitalisation and transaction volumes may 
be high and that secondary market trading may be very efficient does not imply that a given 
financial system is not bank-based.  
A capital market-based financial system is the polar opposite. Not banks but capital markets 
are the main sources of financing for firms and serve as the places where households place a 
                                                 
7  That there are just two types of financial systems is a recent phenomenon. Only a few years ago, the socialist 
countries had their own type of financial system; and at that time many other countries had financial systems in 
which the respective state played a crucial role. The liberalisation and privatisation wave of the 1980s and 1990s 
has lead to the disappearance of the former state-dominated financial systems as a type of its own.   9
large part of their savings. Bank lending is rather restricted in terms of volume and maturities. 
Bank-client relationships are typically not close but rather at arm’s length, and banks do not 
have an active role in corporate governance and in the restructuring of firms that find 
themselves in financial difficulties. In a capital market-based financial system banks are often 
specialized either by law or tradition. Even if universal banking is allowed, banks are still 
specialised or organized in a way which neatly separates their investment and commercial 
banking activities.  
Non-bank financial intermediaries play an important role in capital market-based financial 
systems. They are important depositories of household savings, including retirement savings, 
and they invest a large part of their assets in the stock market. Personal and institutional 
relationships with clients are not essential in such a system since markets dictate the prices 
and are the main medium for directing transactions. Investor information and investor 
protection are more important and more highly developed than in a bank-based financial 
system. Corporate governance is consistent with the rest of the financial system. Banks do not 
play an active role. Instead, the most important governance mechanism is the control of 
management through market forces including the “market for corporate control”. As a 
consequence, corporate governance in a capital market-based financial system is not 
stakeholder oriented but shareholder oriented.  
As one can easily see, the two types of financial systems are fundamentally different. But 
each of them is in itself a consistent system. This raises interesting questions concerning the 
relative merits of the two system types, competition between them and the possible 
convergence of real financial systems. One may wonder whether it is possible to state that one 
of the two types of systems can generally be assessed as being superior to the other. Currently 
many observers seem to be inclined to think that the capital market-based system is superior. 
And if this is so, one may then ask whether countries that so far have largely bank-based 
financial systems are under pressure to also adopt a capital market-based financial system. We 
will come back to this question in the concluding section of our paper.      
III.  Financial Systems, Growth and Development  
1) Finance and growth  
a) Finance as a forgotten and rediscovered source of growth   
Understanding the effects of finance on economic growth and development is necessary for 
anyone who wants to shape finance-related policies or to assess such policies. Already in the 
19
th century, Walter Bagehot, a British journalist and the editor of “The Economist”, stated   10
that the quality of the British financial system was a cause of the economic success that 
Britain enjoyed at that time, since it permitted talented individuals who were not wealthy to 
become entrepreneurs. A similar point was made 50 years later by the Austrian economist 
Joseph Schumpeter. The central figure in his well known theory of economic development 
(1912/1934) is the innovator, the dynamic entrepreneur. But these entrepreneurs rarely have 
large amounts of capital and often also lack business experience. Schumpeter describes “the 
banker” as the ideal partner of “the entrepreneur” by providing both funds and advice. For 
astute bankers, the risk of funding a dynamic entrepreneur is moderate because he keeps close 
and regular contact with the entrepreneur and can threaten to stop funding him if the 
entrepreneur acts unwisely and does not heed the banker’s advice.  
These highly plausible views of Bagehot and Schumpter were eclipsed by the neoclassical 
theory of economic growth developed by Robert Solow (1956) and others. This theory 
focuses exclusively on capital in the sense of real capital, as discussed above. It is important 
to note that it does not simply neglect finance in the sense of financial institutions and 
financial relationships as relevant for growth, but due to its logical structure, it does not even 
permit incorporating any consideration of financial institutions, markets and contracts.  
Other economists were equally sceptical about the role of finance. Joan Robinson (1952) did 
not see a positive effect of finance on growth arguing that developments in the area of finance 
are a reflection and not a cause of growth in the real sector of an economy: “where enterprise 
leads finance follows”. In a widely quoted survey on economic growth, Nicholas Stern (1989) 
did not even mention finance as a potentially relevant factor. In contrast to neoclassical 
growth theory, the so-called new theory of endogenous growth permits incorporating finance. 
But its protagonists did not think that finance is sufficiently important to warrant inclusion.    
The neglect of finance only ended when the World Bank issued its World Development 
Report of 1989. This report argued convincingly that “finance matters”,
8 and offered first 
empirical evidence to support this claim. The empirical research started in the course of the 
preparation of the Word Development Report, and was continued by a group of scholars 
closely connected to the World Bank. In 1993, King and Levine published their seminal 
                                                 
8 „Finance matters“ may always have been clear to practitioners in the financial world. However, under the 
strong influence of the neoclassical theory of perfect markets, it was largely discarded in academic circles. This 
view which became dominant after the publication of the Modigliani-Miller irrelevance propositions around 
1960, was only challenged with the advent of the so-called new institutional economics, that puts imperfect 
markets, incomplete contracts and institutions back into the centre of academic attention.    11
article about “Finance and Growth” with empirical evidence demonstrating that – to quote 
from the title of their paper – “Schumpeter Might be Right”.   
A host of other contributions investigating the finance-growth nexus followed. Some were 
more theoretically oriented, and others had an empirical focus. In a recent survey of the 
literature, Levine (2005) listed the questions addressed by the researchers:  
-   Are finance in the sense of the state of the financial sector and growth related? 
-   Does finance cause growth, and if it does, through which channels of mechanisms?  
-   Do the same factors influence growth in a bank-based system as in a capital market-
based one?  
-   And finally, which system is better for fostering the economic progress?  
 
b) The theoretical debate  
 
There is a large number of economic models that discuss the contributions of finance – in the 
sense of financial intermediaries, markets and contracts – can make to economic growth. 
Their common starting point is the acknowledgement that external financing is difficult, since 
it is plagued by serious information and incentive problems. These problems give rise to 
moral hazard, adverse selection and various forms of agency problems, and might even lead 
to capital rationing as an endogenous feature of financial systems.
9 The merit of financial 
intermediaries, notably banks, and financial markets is that they serve to mitigate these 
problems. Though they do this in different ways, both banks and markets strengthen the 
incentives to collect and use information before a financial relationship with a firm is 
established and to monitor the borrowing firms when such a relationship has come into 
existence. By performing these functions of screening and monitoring both intermediaries and 
markets reduce the fears that potential providers of external finance might have and that might 
make them reluctant to lend or invest. Financial institutions facilitate external finance.  
There are essentially two effects of finance as a source of growth. One is that the sheer 
quantity of external financing is increased; thus finance contributes to the accumulation of 
capital, the main engine of growth according to neoclassical theory. The other one is that, 
through its screening and monitoring functions, finance improves the efficiency of capital 
allocation, thus contributing to technical progress as the main engine of economic growth 
according to the Schumpeterian line of reasoning.     
                                                 
9 Here the work of Joseph Stiglitz is particularly relevant; see Stiglitz (1985) for a general survey and 
Stiglitz/Weiss (1981) on capital rationing as an endogenous effect of information and incentive problems that are 
to be expected in financial markets.    12
Most theoretical models presented in the literature focus either on banks or financial markets, 
and they emphasise either the function of fostering capital accumulation or that of promoting 
innovation and increasing the productivity of the use of capital. Some contributions point out 
that banks can have some positive effects or perform certain functions very well, while 
markets are good at performing other functions well. As an example, banks seem to be 
particularly good at creating and using private information. On the other hand markets seem 
particularly well suited to aggregating diverse pieces of public information. While banks are 
able to mitigate what Allen and Gale (1995, 1997, 2000) call intertemporal risk that 
negatively affects the entire economy, well organised markets are very good at reducing and 
allocating so called intratemporal risks, that is, risks in a given time period. In some 
contributions, intermediaries and markets are regarded as performing complementary 
functions, while in some others the adverse effects of one type of institutions on the 
performance of the other type is highlighted. The contribution of Allen and Gale may once 
more serve to illustrate this point. As these authors show, the ability of banks to reduce 
intertemporal risks is undermined if capital markets are highly developed.   
We do not have the space to go into more detail here and refer the readers to the available 
surveys
10 and the original contributions. In summarising what is discussed there, we want to 
conclude with three remarks. The first one is that the theoretical literature focuses on finance 
in a broad sense and not merely on capital, and emphasises those aspects of information, 
incentives and institutions that characterise finance a special field. The second remark is that, 
by and large, this literature points out the merits of banks and other intermediaries and thereby 
creates a counterweight to the emphasis on markets in today’s economic mainstream. The 
third and final remark is that the theoretical literature highlights the importance of the 
question whether banks or markets – and in a broader sense a bank-based or a capital market-
based financial system – can in some meaningful way be called “better”, but has not yet come 
up with a conclusive answer.  
c) The empirical debate  
The empirical research on the link between financial development and economic growth can 
be traced back to the pioneering work of Goldsmith (1969). Goldsmith analysed the 
relationship between the financial structure, that is the financial sector as defined above, and 
real activity at a time when computers and large scale data bases were not yet available and 
                                                 
10 Excellent surveys are provided by Allen/Gale (2000 and 2001) and Levine (2005).    13
econometric techniques were not yet widely known. Using cross-country data Goldsmith 
found evidence of a positive time trend of the ratio of financial institutions’ assets to GDP for 
a sample of 35 countries over a century (1860-1963). Many authors have later extended and 
refined this line of inquiry and have basically confirmed Goldsmith’s early findings.
11  
The existing empirical literature can be divided into three classes, those using cross sectional 
analysis, those using a time-series approach, and those employing panel data methods – a 
combination of both techniques.  Each of these approaches has indisputably  made useful 
contributions to the examination of the relationship between finance and growth. However, it 
must be emphasized that they suffer from some important limitations which do not allow us to 
take all results at face value. The general problem of all empirical studies is that, to examine 
the relationship between financial development and growth, one has to define appropriate 
measures of financial development. Researchers come up with various definitions and 
measures. Some studies use the size of the banking sector typically measured by the deposit 
liabilities to GDP or bank claims on the private sector to GDP, others use the size of the stock 
markets, defined as market capitalization to GDP or total value of domestic equities traded on 
the stock exchanges to GDP. However, these measures have been criticized by others. One 
concern is that financial development may be a leading indicator rather a cause of economic 
growth. It may predict growth as financial markets discount the value of future opportunities 
and financial intermediaries lend more when they anticipate economic growth, and both 
financial development and growth can be driven by some omitted factors such as the 
propensity of households to save. This concern is most important in the case of cross-section 
studies.  
The studies based on cross-country comparisons focus on determining the strength of the 
partial correlation between financial development and some growth indicators by averaging 
the variables across countries. The evidence they provide is consistent with the view that 
more developed financial sectors positively affect long-run economic growth. These studies 
lend support to both the neoclassical and the Schumpeterian views that growth is caused by 
capital accumulation and innovation or technical progress. Moreover, they seem to suggest 
that finance does not follow growth but leads it. Levine and Zervos (1998) go one step further 
than earlier authors and combine the empirical models with the theoretical approaches in 
order to conclude that bank and stock market development have independent effects on 
growth as they provide different financial services.  
                                                 
11 For surveys of methods and results see World Bank (2001) and Levine (2005).    14
In one of his studies, Levine (1999) undertakes a first attempt to empirically assess which 
type of financial system is more favourable for economic growth. Interestingly, he does not 
find any evidence that the type of the system matters for economic growth. However, his 
results support the hypothesis advanced by La Porta et al. (1998) that the type of the legal 
system of a country significantly influences financial sector development and thereby 
indirectly also causes economic growth. The legal rights of investors as well as the efficiency 
with which these rights are enforced determine the quality of financial services and hence 
economic growth rates.  
The recognition that even statistically highly significant positive associations between 
financial development and economic growth are not sufficient to define the direction of 
causality of the finance-growth nexus was first made by Patrick (1966). Echoing Joan 
Robinson, Patrick argued that the opposite direction of causation, that is general economic 
growth leading to financial development, is also possible. This criticism has stimulated the 
development of the second methodology to study the finance-growth nexus, which uses time-
series methods. Time series studies do not implicitly make the simple and questionable 
assumption that all countries exhibit the same financial structure. Moreover, time-series 
techniques do not only permit to study the partial correlation between financial development 
and growth but also to identify dynamic interactions among the variables. This allows a better 
assessment of the direction and the strength of causation.  
The empirical results of time series studies and also those of panel studies are less clear-cut 
than those of the cross-section studies seem to be. While Rousseau and Watchel (1998) found 
a strong positive relationship between the level of financial intermediation and growth for five 
industrialized countries, Thornton (1996) and Demetriades and Hussein (1996) came to the 
opposite conclusion. Thornton performed Granger causality tests for 22 developing countries 
and did not find support for the hypothesis that finance leads to growth. Demetriades and 
Hussein (1996) found that only in four out of the 16 countries they analysed there is a positive 
effect of financial development on growth. In two other cases finance seems to follow growth, 
and in seven cases the finance-growth relationship seems to be much more complex. Their 
result suggests that different levels of economic development may explain the different 
relationships between finance and growth. In a similar vain, Jalilian and Kirkpatrick (2002) 
identified a threshold effect. Once a certain level of economic development has been reached, 
further financial development does not seem to have a growth-enhancing role. Hence, finance 
may have a positive growth impact only in developing countries. Even more interestingly,   15
Rioja and Valev (2004) found that banking sector development affects economic growth 
through different factors in developing countries than in developed countries. Financial 
development has a greater effect on growth based on enhanced capital accumulation in 
developing countries, while the impact on innovation seems to be stronger in industrialised 
countries.  
Another set of studies looks at industry and firm-level data to see if there is any positive effect 
of finance on growth and, if yes, if banks or markets have stronger growth effects. For 
instance, a study by Demirgüc-Kunt and Maksimovic (2000) finds that the rate of firms that 
receive external financing is positively related to the development of both capital markets and 
banks. But these authors also cannot find evidence that the organization of financial systems 
affects firms’ ability to obtain external financing and hence their growth.  
d) Conclusions and open issues   
The sheer quantity of the empirical evidence that is available by now suggests that there is a 
positive relationship between financial development and growth, even though this relationship 
is not mechanical and uniform and depends on a variety of factors, whereas bank-based and 
capital market-based financial systems may both be about equally good. These two general 
findings are not all that surprising, and they seem to corroborate the results of the relevant 
theoretical studies. However, one should not overestimate the closeness of the correspondence 
between theoretical and empirical results. The need to use available data forces the empiricists 
to employ simple measures for financial development as explanatory variables and for growth 
as the dependent variable. These measures are much less subtle than those to which the 
theorists refer in their models. In fact, what Levine and his colleagues have shown so far is 
only that there is a positive relationship between different measures of financial sector size 
and GDP growth, but not between financial sector quality and development in a broader sense 
of the word. Based on what we discussed in the last section, we regard it as an interesting 
challenge for future empirical research to determine whether the growth impact of a financial 
system depends on its quality measured by some standard of its internal consistency.  
2. Finance and development  
As long as one looks mainly or even exclusively at industrialised countries’ financial systems, 
the focus on GDP growth that characterises most of the relevant literature is appropriate. But 
when one looks at the so-called developing countries, as we do in this section, it is definitely   16
too narrow. Development is more than growth. It is also concerned with the distribution of 
wealth, income and economic opportunities. Moreover, development also has to do with the 
structure of societies and political systems. Correspondingly, development policy aims at 
achieving a more equitable distribution of income and opportunities and creating open and 
stable economic, social and political systems. As we argue in this section, the financial system 
and its quality are a crucial determinant of development in this broad sense.  
How are finance and development related? The first link is that the financial sectors of most 
developing countries are underdeveloped. Lack of financial development reflects general 
underdevelopment and is both a consequence and a cause of general underdevelopment. A 
low level of financial development shows up in a lack of financial institutions, in inefficiency 
and instability of those institutions that exist and in a financial sector that does not provide 
services to a large part of the economically active population. In many developing countries 
not only the really poor but also middle class business people do not get bank loans.   
In view of the considerable benefits that a country may be able to gain from having a good 
financial infrastructure one may wonder why many financial systems are so underdeveloped. 
This has three reasons. One is a misguided policy of “financial repression” that has its roots in 
the false notion that finance is not important and that has seriously restrained the emergence 
of banks and financial markets. The second reason was that those who held power used and 
“abused” the financial sector for their own enrichment.
12 The third reason was, and still is, 
that it is simply very difficult to create a healthy financial sector in inhospitable environments. 
Finance has to overcome pervasive information and incentive problems that are even stronger 
in developing countries than in advanced countries with well functioning legal systems.   
There is also a close connection between financial systems and development policy. For many 
years, development finance consisted in simply channelling capital from developed to 
developing countries. For a long time after World War II, this policy consisted in transferring 
large volumes of capital to fund governments and big infrastructure and industrial projects. 
Then, after 1973, policies changed. The transfer of capital was redirected to specific target 
groups of  poor people that policy makers in the donor countries considered as needy and 
worthy of external support. These target group-oriented capital transfers deliberately avoided 
using the formal financial sector as a conduit because development experts were convinced 
that existing commercial and development banks were neither willing nor able to reach poor 
                                                 
12 The critique of these policy approaches is summarised in two interesting volumes edited by Von Pischke et al. 
(1983) and Adams et al. (1984).   17
target groups. Under the old conditions of “financial repression” this assessment was clearly 
justified.  
However, development policy did not always treat finance as synonymous with capital. A 
third phase of development finance policy took a completely different perspective and 
“detected” that finance can also be understood in the sense of financial institutions and 
markets. It whole-heartedly subscribed to the new learning of Shaw (1973) and McKinnon 
(1973) that instead of financial repression, liberalisation and deregulation of the financial 
sector were called for. Some experts expected that banks that were set free to pursue their own 
financial interests would soon start to extend loans to the formerly neglected clients and that 
they would do this wisely. However, this expectation was frustrated. Instead of opening up to 
a new clientele, many financial institutions took on too much risk and entire financial sectors 
became highly instable and collapsed under the burden of bad loans (Diaz-Alejandro, 1995). 
What the ultra-libertarian policy makers had overlooked was exactly what Stiglitz (1988) had 
taught for years: finance is shaped by serious information and incentive problems, and 
therefore financial systems must be regulated and guided by policies that limit risk-taking.  
This negative experience finally paved the way for a new policy approach that aims at 
strengthening financial systems by building up financial institutions that are at the same time 
financially viable and socially relevant. Recent experience suggests that this latest 
development policy approach, which considers finance in a broad sense and focuses on 
financial systems, on institution building and incentive design may finally be successful.
13  
IV. Differences between National Financial Systems             
    
We start this section with a brief look at some financial statistics. Figure 1, which is taken 
from a recent article by Allen et al. (2004), shows very clearly that even in the recent past, 
there are considerable differences between the weights that bank loans and publicly traded 
shares and bonds – that is banks and markets – have in different national financial systems.   
 
 
 
                                                 
13 An early advocate of the new direction of development finance policy is Von Pischke (1993); see also 
Armandáriz de Aghion/Morduch (2005) and Schmidt/Von Pischke (2005) for more recent contributions.     18
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Figure 1: Size of Financial Systems Components by Countries and Regions 
 
The differences may appear even more pronounced when one looks at the role of banks as 
measured by intermediation ratios (Schmidt et al., 1999) and at the financing patterns of non-
financial firms (Hackethal/Schmidt, 2004). The surprising findings of these studies is that 
even though all financial systems are affected by some common factors which tend to reduce 
the role of banks, the differences have remained as pronounced as they have been for a long 
time in absolute terms and even increased in relative terms. For instance, the ratio of 
intermediation of firms vis-à-vis banks, that is, the share of external financing of non-
financial firms that comes from banks in the forms of equity and loans, in the US and UK is 
only about one third of that for Germany and Japan, even though in both groups of countries 
this intermediation ratios has fallen between the mid-sixties and the end of the last century. 
As we argued above, it may not be enough to look at individual elements of a financial system 
if one wants to understand its internal logic and also its development. We therefore 
supplement the statistical information by a short look at individual financial systems with a 
view to the question if these systems have changed their structure in the recent past or are 
about to change.  
The example of the American financial system has already been used above to illustrate the 
concepts of complementarity and consistency. America has had a capital market-based system 
for many years. As Mark Roe (1994) has argued, the origins of this system are mainly 
political in nature. Like all financial systems, that of the US is shaped by complementarity,   19
and by and large it is also consistent. The respective roles of banks and capital markets are in 
line with the dominant way in which firms finance their investment needs and with the 
prevailing bank-client relationship, with the way in which households save and accumulate 
wealth, with the corporate governance system and with pension finance, just to mention the 
most important elements of a financial system. Bank lending for business purposes is limited 
in quantitative terms and in terms of maturity, forcing firms to use the securities markets for 
financing and at the same time reflecting this choice of financing sources. Bank-client 
relations are not close but “at arm’s length” and banks rarely play a positive role if a 
borrowing firm gets into trouble. In view of the limited role of bank lending and of the 
American bankruptcy law, this is not surprising. Banks also do not own shares and are not 
actively involved in the governance of companies to which they lend. But of course, why 
should they incur the risks and costs which would be related with a different policy? 
Households use pension funds and other non-bank financial intermediaries for their savings, 
and these institutions invest the major part of the funds they manage in the stock market thus 
providing the funding which firms require. The stock market is not only important for firm 
financing and (indirect) household savings in the U.S., but at least in principle it is also a key 
element of the corporate governance regime: the threat of a hostile takeover keeps managers 
tied to shareholders interests.  
This is in a nutshell how one could have described the American financial system some time 
ago (e.g. Kaufman, 1997), and by and large the description is still valid today. Interestingly, 
the relative importance of banks has further decreased in recent years while that of the stock 
market has increased. The British financial system resembles the American system in its basic 
structure despite a number of differences. In both countries those features of their financial 
systems that make the systems capital market-oriented have become more pronounced over 
time. The systems were largely consistent in the past, and they have remained consistent until 
today. Of course, since they are capital market-based systems one would not expect them to 
change in a fundamental way.  
As mentioned above the financial systems of Germany and Japan have for many years been 
bank-dominated. Banks were the main players in the financial sector and the entire financial 
system, providing the majority of the external financing of firms and collecting a considerable 
part of the financial savings generated by households and exerting a strong influence on other 
financial sector institutions. Due to the high level of long-term bank financing, banks had 
reasons to establish close relationships with firms and to become actively involved in the   20
governance of large corporations. This enabled them to better monitor their borrowers and 
thereby to limit their credit risk.  
Given the strong role that banks played in the German financial system in a not so distant 
past, it is not surprising that Germany’s organised capital markets have long been neglected 
and are still today almost irrelevant as a source of enterprise financing and completely 
irrelevant as a force in corporate governance, although in terms of absolute capitalisation the 
German and Japanese stock markets are amongst the biggest in the world. Households in 
continental Europe and Japan own significantly fewer financial assets than those in UK and 
US. Their financial portfolios are dominated by relatively safe assets. As a consequence, the 
German and Japanese households bear significantly less financial risk than those in Anglo-
Saxon countries.  
Traditional national systems of corporate governance in Germany and Japan complement the 
picture. By law and tradition, corporate governance used to be stakeholder-oriented and 
insider-controlled. Banks and employees were important actors in corporate governance, 
alongside shareholders which in the case of Germany would typically hold considerable 
blocks of shares. These groups were the dominant forces in the supervisory boards in 
Germany and corresponding for in Japan. Together with top managers, they constituted what 
one might call a “grand coalition” that determined corporate policy. And in fact, large firms 
were for a long time managed in the “common interest” of those represented in this “grand 
coalition”: stability and growth – or rather stable growth – and not shareholder value were the 
maxims followed by most large firms.   
For many years, the various elements of the financial systems of Germany and Japan were not 
only complementary but also consistent. For instance, the dominant way of financing was 
well adjusted to the corporate governance regimes, to the respective roles of banks and capital 
markets in the two financial sectors, to the prevailing pension systems, etc – and vice-versa. 
We do not want to explain the causes and consequences of consistency in more detail here, 
but refer the readers to the relevant literature
14. For a long time, the two financial systems 
seem to have been very valuable for the respective economies (Porter, 1992). However, this 
may no longer be the case now as it used to be, as we will discuss in the concluding section.  
                                                 
14 Two recent major publications about the German and the Japanese financial systems, namely 
Krahnen/Schmidt (2004) and Hoshi/Kashiap (2001), are surprisingly similar in that they both attach great 
importance to the aspects of complementarity and consistency in analysing the two systems.    21
The French financial system is another interesting example of how financial systems used to 
function and how they have changed recently. Until the middle of the 1980s, the French 
financial sector and in fact the entire French financial system was shaped by government 
influence in a fundamental way such that the system could well be considered to constitute a 
financial system type of its own. Though again under active guidance and leadership of the 
government, this system was dismantled after 1985. Disregarding this specific and 
characteristic former state influence, one could also describe the former French financial 
system as a strongly bank-dominated (Faugère/Voisin 1994). However, after the 
transformation of the last two decades, this characterisation is no longer appropriate. Now this 
system is almost as clearly-capital market-dominated as those of the U.S. and the U.K. 
(Plihon et al., 2006). We will take up the importance of cases like the French one in the 
following and concluding section in which we look at the important questions of how 
financial systems develop and if we can expect a general convergence of financial systems in 
Europe and possibly even world-wide.  
IV. The Development of Financial Systems 
1. How financial systems develop        
 
The statistical data and the descriptions of national financial systems presented in the last 
section show two trends that seem rather contradictory. One is that in almost all financial 
systems the values taken on by those financial sector indicators that represent the role of 
capital markets increase over time. This suggests a tendency of a general convergence 
towards the Anglo-Saxon model of a capital market-based financial system, although this is 
no conclusive evidence since systems are more than collections of individual elements. The 
other trend is that in many countries the characteristics remain largely intact. As the 
descriptions show, the German financial system still seems to be bank-dominated, and the 
Anglo-Saxon countries USA and UK still have capital market-dominated financial systems. 
This would argue against general convergence at least so far and at least as a convergence 
towards some “intermediate” type of financial system might be concerned.  
The contradictory trends of change on the one hand and stability on the other suggest looking 
in detail into the “laws” that govern the development of entire financial systems and not   22
merely at isolated indicators. There are many views on how financial systems develop over 
time. But for space reasons we restrict ourselves to discussing only three of them.
15   
One view is that of a „natural progression“ from bank-based to capital market-based systems. 
This is the most widely held view, shared by most practitioners and politicians as well as by 
many scholars. This view may simply be based on observations of time series data like those 
compiled by Goldsmith (1969), or it may be based on the belief that a capital market-based 
system is simply better than a bank-based system. If applicable, this “efficiency-pull” 
argument would provide strong support for this view. The international experience of the last 
fifteen years makes this position plausible since it seems to demonstrate the economic 
superiority of the capital market-based systems of the U.S. and the U.K, which may in turn 
explain the trend towards more market orientation showing up in the data. However, if one 
looks at the debate of only fifteen years ago, one finds the opposite assessment expressed by 
influential authors such as Michael C. Porter (1992). Moreover, as we argued above, recent 
empirical work as well as theoretical models such as those presented by Allen/Gale (2000) 
and in a large number of papers by Stiglitz do not support the underlying conviction that 
capital market-based financial systems are in some well-defined sense better than bank-based 
systems; and if there is not the assumed “efficiency pull” of the allegedly superior system, the 
idea of a “natural progression” loses much of its appeal.  
The second view is based on the assumption that the dichotomy of bank-based and capital 
market-based financial systems is not generally valid and may already have lost its relevance. 
It may only represent a specific historical situation in which it was impossible to combine the 
strength of intermediaries and markets. Financial innovation may change this situation soon 
and generate new options including some which permit combining the strengths of a bank 
based-system with those of a capital market based system. Seen from the situation of today, 
what might soon emerge would be “hybrid systems”. A very instructive example of how the 
strengths of both systems can be combined successfully is securitization (Franke/Krahnen, 
2005). The World Bank (2001) also argues that a synthesis of two financial systems – or a 
                                                 
15 Other views can only be mentioned briefly. One of them is that of LaPorta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and 
Vishny. In a set of papers (e.g. 1998) that have attracted great attention in the academic community, these 
authors have argued that the character of a country’s financial system is strongly determined by the country’s 
legal tradition (see also Glaeser/Shleifer, 2002). The problem with this proposition is that if one took it literally it 
would suggest that financial systems cannot change their character at all, since a country’s legal tradition is 
simply given. In opposition to this view, Rajan and Zingales (2003) have recently argued that instead of long-
term stability  there are at times “great reversals”, meaning that many national financial systems have undergone 
fundamental changes – both from having bank-based to having capital market-based financial systems and in the 
opposite direction. None of these two views seems too convincing to us, but as will become clear later we would 
rather accept the “great reversals” view than the other one.   23
“hybrid system” – is a perspective that is attractive and possibly also empirically relevant 
because it strengthens both efficient capital allocation in a short term perspective and 
competition as a determinant of long-term welfare. However, so far there are only very few 
convincing examples that might suggest that a synthesis can be viable and economically 
attractive. Moreover, the generalisation of an argument that refers to one single financial 
instrument such as securitisation to the case of financial systems in general has so far not been 
shown to be possible.
16  
The third view builds on the concepts of complementarity and consistency presented in 
section II.4 above, where we argued that financial systems are shaped by complementarity 
and that the consistency of a financial system is extremely important for its economic effects. 
Inconsistencies cause welfare losses, and if complementarity is indeed important, these losses 
can be substantial. Let us assume, for the sake of illustration, that welfare or efficiency 
differences between different financial systems can be quantified and assessed by an outside 
observer. Based on what was discussed in section III, such an observer might be inclined to 
think that consistent bank based and consistent capital market-based financial systems are 
largely equal in welfare terms: Perhaps there is no difference at all, or the difference is small. 
However, if complementarity is an important determinant of how well any financial system 
functions, the welfare difference between consistent and clearly inconsistent financial systems 
will be considerable.  
2. Why complementarity may prevent or foster convergence  
What does this imply for the possibility and the likelihood of a convergence? Under the 
assumptions which we have made and which we find plausible, starting from any situation 
that is characterised by inconsistencies that may have arisen from mixing incompatible 
elements or features of bank-based and capital market-based financial systems, the possible 
welfare gain that could be achieved by re-establishing consistency – if this were possible – 
within any of the two types of financial system would be substantial. In such a situation wise 
policy makers would most probably aspire to re-establish consistency fast and with a fair 
chance of reaching this goal. In principle, the outcome of this process is undetermined, 
depending very much on which immediate gains in efficiency seem achievable in the specific 
situation. But in practice it is often easier to “mend” the financial system a country is used to 
than adopting a fundamentally different one.  
                                                 
16 Moreover, there are theoretical arguments that speak against the possibility of having a „hybrid model“, see 
e.g. Boot/Thakor (2000).   24
If a possible transformation process started from a situation that is characterised by 
consistency of the financial system, complementarity could prevent efficiency-induced 
convergence. This has two reasons. One is that no one knows which system type is really 
better; policy makers might understand this and refrain from even attempting to implement a 
different system type than the one that prevails in their country. The other reason is that the 
transition from one consistent system to the other one would cause severe, though temporary, 
welfare losses, which wise policy makers would want to avoid.  
Of course, all of this does not preclude that financial systems change in a fundamental way, 
which would amount to switching from a bank-based to a capital market-based system or 
vice-versa.
17 In a number of countries we currently observe the switch or transition from 
banks to capital markets as the central and defining element of the financial system. In the 
past, there were several cases in which a similarly profound change occurred in the opposite 
direction. The changes may have political reasons and may be caused by a crisis, as it was 
certainly the case after the great depression of 1930 and the Second World War when many 
countries adopted bank-dominated financial systems with strong political means such as the 
nationalisation of banks (France), the closing of markets (Japan and Germany) or the 
introduction of very restrictive banking laws (USA). Prevailing economic doctrines supported 
these moves of the past as they currently support the move from banks to markets.  
The most important condition under which a fundamental change of the financial system can 
occur is that gross inconsistencies exist, that they have serious negative consequences and that 
these consequences are also felt by the general public. In the recent past, the French financial 
system provided a telling example. The former state dominance of the French financial 
system had become unsustainable in the 1980s. This situation made the government initiate a 
fundamental switch towards a capital market-oriented financial system. As the theory of 
complementarity suggest, the transition was very difficult and lead to more than a decade of 
turmoil and crisis in the French financial system. But by now this phase is over, and the 
French system is in a much better shape than it has been for many years.  
However, there are limits to which switches are possible. In a recent paper Hackethal et al. 
(2006) argue that at present no country can opt for introducing a bank-based financial system 
if it did not have one before. The reason is that, due to globalisation, the economic pressure on 
any country to have a good financial system is strong, that a bank based system can only 
                                                 
17 In other words and using the term coined by Rajan and Zingales (2003), there can be “great reversals”.     25
function well if it operates on the basis of trust among economic agents and a tradition of 
concluding and honouring implicit contracts. These prerequisites cannot be imposed by 
government fiat, and if they have once existed and have disappeared, they cannot easily be 
restored. For the specific case of Germany, Hackethal et al. (2006) argue that it might even be 
impossible to restore the old bank-based system even though it existed before and used to 
function well. This proposition is valid even though a bank-based financial system might in 
principle be as good as or even better than a capital market based system.
18 Given that its 
financial system is currently plagued by serious inconsistencies, Germany might be forced to 
follow the French example and to also switch to a capital market-based system, since it may 
not be possible to restore the social, political and economic foundations on which the old 
system rested.    
A similar situation may obtain in Japan, which also used to have a well functioning bank-
based system for 50 years. The suffering of the Japanese financial system was long and had 
serious negative consequences for the economy. Whether Japan emerges from this crisis 
period with a restored bank-based system or with a capital market-based system remains to be 
seen (Hoshi/Kashiap, 2001). The situation of several countries in the South of Europe, 
especially Italy and Spain, may be similar.
19 And there is an additional factor that applies in 
all EU countries. Financial sector policy is now made in Brussels and no longer in the 
individual countries. EU financial sector policy is shaped by two tendencies at the same time. 
On the one side, it favours the general adoption of the Anglo-Saxon model; and on the other 
side EU policy seems to aspire a mix of what the EU Commission considers to be the best 
elements of the different national systems. The theory of complementarity suggests that the 
latter policy cannot work. It would lead to inconsistencies. Since inconsistent systems are not 
efficient and may become unsustainable, this policy of a “middle of the road” approach is 
ultimately an additional indirect way of imposing the Anglo-Saxon financial system. 
Therefore, we might end up with the same type of financial system in all of Europe and thus a 
convergence of the financial systems in the entire Western world to occur relatively soon.  
 
 
 
                                                 
18 Note that this is hypothetical assumption. It does not mean that the authors claim that is indeed better.  
19 For a discussion of the possible development path of the different national financial systems in Europe see 
Gaspar et al. (2003).    26
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